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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The re-issuance of a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit for discharges from the Moutard Electric
Generating Station (MEGS) by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) Region XII was petitioned for review by EnerProg,
L.L.C., the permittee, and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc., an
environmental group. Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. 124.19 (2017), the
authority to review was reserved to the Environmental Appeals
Board (EAB), which denied both petitions for review. A notice of
appeal was timely filed by both parties seeking review under this
Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to section 509(b) of the Clean Water
Act (CWA). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2012). The petitions have been
rightfully consolidated by this Court for the purpose of its review.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
I.

Does the EPA have jurisdiction to review the permit
conditions imposed by a State?

II.

Are the conditions imposed under State of Progress law
consistent with section 401(d) of the Clean Water Act,
independent of whether EPA has jurisdiction to review
State required permit conditions?

III.

Does the April 25, 2017 Notice issued by EPA suspend
permit compliance deadlines for certain requirements
promulgated under the 2015 Effluent Limitations
Guidelines for the Steam Power Generating Industry?

IV.

Notwithstanding 2015 Effluent Guidelines, is Best
Professional Judgment valid alternative grounds to require
zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes?

V.

Is the MEGS coal ash pond a water of the United States
subject to section 402 permitting requirements?
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Does closure of the MEGS coal ash pond require a fill permit
subject to CWA section 404?

STATEMENT OF CASE
I.

Facts

The Moutard Electric Generating Station (MEGS) is a coalfired steam electric power plant owned and operated by EnerProg,
L.L.C. in the State of Progress. In re EnerProg, L.L.C., NPDES
Appeal No. 17-0123, slip op. at 6 (EAB, 2017). The MEGS plant
provides baseload generating capacity for Progress, with a
maximum dependable capacity of 745 megawatts (MW). Id. at 7.
The MEGS plant draws water from the nearby Moutard Reservoir
to produce steam for electricity generation. Id. Overall, the facility
has an actual intake flow of less than 125 million gallons per day
(MGD) from the Moutard Reservoir. Id. This water is used in the
plant’s closed-cycle cooling system via operation of a cooling tower,
as well as in the transport and treatment of coal ash waste created
through electricity production. Id. This wastewater undergoes
treatment through sedimentation in a coal ash pond before it is
discharged back into the Moutard Reservoir via a riser structure
at Outfall 002. Id. The coal ash pond is a free-standing body of
water created in 1978 by impounding waters from the upper reach
of Fossil Creek, a perennial tributary to the Progress River. Id.
The EPA regulates discharges from Outfall 002 under the
authority of the Clean Water Act (CWA) which prohibits the
discharge of any pollutants into regulated waterways without a
permit issued under the National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) or other approved state permitting program. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1342 (2012); EnerProg, slip op. at 7. Direct
discharges from the MEGS facility into the Moutard Reservoir via
Outfall 002 are authorized and regulated under an NPDES permit
issued by EPA Region XII. Id.
The NPDES permitting process requires EPA Region XII staff
to work closely with regulatory authorities in the State of Progress
to ensure that any discharges authorized under the permit are in
compliance with federal effluent limits and water quality
standards under the CWA. 33 U.S.C. § 1341. This relationship
underlines the EPA’s congressional directive to improve and
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promote the health of the nation’s waterways through enforcement
of federal standards in cooperation with state and local
government. See Congressional Declaration of Goals and Policy, 33
U.S.C. § 1251. The section 401 state certification process
exemplifies this approach, wherein the state affirms that a
proposed NPDES permit meets all relevant CWA standards and
applicable state law. Id. §§ 1341(a)(1), 1342. In the present case,
the certifying entity is the State of Progress. EnerProg, slip op. at
6.
As part of its certification, the State of Progress sought to
include conditions requiring EnerProg to cease operation of its coal
ash pond by November 1, 2018, completely dewater the pond by
September 1, 2019, and cover the dewatered pond with an
impermeable cap by September 1, 2020. Id. The conditions are
rooted in the State of Progress Coal Ash Cleanup Act (CACA), and
additionally entail rerouting of all ash transport waters currently
discharged into the coal ash pond to a new lined retention basin.
Id. at 9. Shutting down the coal ash pond as a part of the transition
to dry-handling of coal ash wastes would necessarily eliminate
direct discharges of bottom ash and fly ash discharges (“ash
handling wastes”) from the pond to the Moutard Reservoir at
Outfall 002. These wastes include elevated levels of mercury,
arsenic, and selenium, which are toxic chemicals regulated by the
EPA. Id.
EPA Region XII staff reviewed the proposed requirements of
the section 401 certification for both feasibility and consistency
with federal water quality standards. Id. at 9. Upon review, Agency
staff found that the section 401 certification conditions proposed by
the State of Progress were consistent with CWA pollution and
water quality standards. Id. Specifically, the permit writer
concluded that a transition to dry-handling of coal ash wastes,
which eliminates toxic discharges associated with ash transport
waters, was feasible for the MEGS facility. Id. The permit writer
thus determined that zero discharge of ash handling wastes by
November 1, 2018—the date of closure of the coal ash pond—
constitutes Best Available Technology (BAT) for such discharges
and was an appropriate permit requirement. Id. Zero discharge of
coal ash handling wastes was determined to be BAT under the
2015 revised Effluent Limitation Guidelines for the Steam Electric
Generating Point Source Category (“2015 ELGs”). 40 C.F.R. 423.
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However, compliance deadlines for the 2015 ELGs have been
postponed by order of the Administrator, pending a legal challenge
to the rule in the Fifth Circuit. See Postponement of Compliance
Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric
Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005
(Apr. 25, 2017).
Upon completion of review and finding that the certification
conditions proposed by the State of Progress were appropriate, the
Region XII Administrator provided public notice and opportunity
for a hearing on the NPDES permit in accordance with 40 C.F.R.
§ 121.23. EnerProg, slip op. at 10. EnerProg, the MEGS facility
operator, and Fossil Creek Watchers, Inc. (FCW), a local
environmental organization, both filed comments on the permit.
On January 18, 2017, EPA Region XII officially re-issued the
NPDES permit to EnerProg. Id. at 6.
II.

Procedural History

Upon the EPA Region XII’s re-issuance of the NPDES permit,
EnerProg and FCW filed timely petitions for review with the EAB
requesting the permit be remanded to Region XII for further
consideration. Id. EnerProg challenged the following: the inclusion
in the final permit of a cap-and-closure condition in the CWA
Section 401 Certification; the inclusion of zero discharge
requirements from the 2015 revised Effluent Limitation
Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source
Category; and, in the event that 2015 ELGs do not apply, EPA
Region XII’s reliance on Best Professional Judgment to impose the
same zero discharge requirements. FCW challenged Region XII’s
determination that internal discharges into the coal ash pond were
not subject to effluent limits under section 402, and separately
challenged the requirements for dewatering and capping the coal
ash pond as unauthorized without first obtaining a section 404 fill
permit. The EAB denied both EnerProg and FCW’s petitions for
review.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The EPA has the authority to review the permissibility of
State of Progress certification conditions for EnerProg’s NPDES
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permit under CWA section 401(d). The conditioning authority
given to states under section 401(d) is not “unbounded.” PUD No.
1 of Jefferson Cty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 712
(1994). The bounded nature of state certification conditions implies
that an entity must be entrusted with the authority to review such
conditions. This entity must be the EPA based on its existing
authority to review state water quality standards under CWA
section 303 and its role in administering the CWA. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313 (2012); PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712–13. Therefore, the EPA
has the authority to review state certification conditions based on
similar authority already given to it under the CWA, as well as to
preserve the regulatory balance between the EPA and states as
envisioned by Congress in enacting the CWA.
The State of Progress’ certification conditions requiring
capping and closure of the MEGS coal ash pond constitute an
“appropriate requirement of state law.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). In
determining whether a state certification condition is an
appropriate requirement of state law, courts first look to its
consistency with other CWA sections pertaining to state water
quality standards and effluent limitations. PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at
713–14. Courts then look to its consistency with “additional state
laws.” Id. The State of Progress’ capping and closure requirements
for coal ash ponds can reasonably be seen as “narrative
statements” consistent with state water quality standards as the
requirements are set with the intention of ensuring that any
leakage from the coal ash pond will not adversely affect the quality
of surrounding navigable waters. See 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b); PUD
No. 1, 511 U.S. at 715. Furthermore, these capping and closure
requirements can also be seen as effluent limitations as their
purpose is to limit total effluent from the closed coal ash pond to
zero. Even if capping and closure requirements are not considered
water quality standards or effluent limitations, they can still
reasonably be considered appropriate requirements of state law
based on the broad deference given to states under CWA section
401. See S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370,
386 (2006).
EPA’s April 25, 2017 Notice is valid and effective to suspend
the compliance deadlines of the 2015 ELGs pursuant to section 705
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Section 705 states:
“[w]hen an agency finds that justice so requires, it may postpone
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the effective date of action taken by it, pending judicial review.” 5
U.S.C. § 705 (2012) (emphasis added). A statute is interpreted in
the context of any explicit definitions that Congress assigned to
words pertinent to the statute’s language. See Burgess v. United
States, 553 U.S. 124, 129 (2008). “Agency action” and “rule” have
distinct definitions in the APA. Therefore, a plain reading of the
statute suggests that Congress authorized an agency to postpone
the effective date of an agency action, not merely the effective date
of a rule. Because compliance deadlines are agency actions, the
Administrator’s finding that “justice so require[d]” staying the
compliance deadlines is valid in light of pending litigation
involving the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. Furthermore, EPA
was not required to undergo notice-and-comment procedures
before issuing the Stay Notice, as the notice is not a rulemaking.
If this Court upholds the Stay Notice, the zero discharge
requirements can still be included in EnerProg’s permit on the
basis of Best Professional Judgment (BPJ). In order to further the
objectives of the CWA, Congress authorized the EPA to regulate
pollutants and set effluent limits on a case-by-case basis when
national guidelines are inadequate. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (a). Courts
are highly deferential to the technical expertise of EPA and its
permit writers when reviewing BPJ requirements, and review such
agency conclusions applying an arbitrary and capricious standard.
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 808 F.3d 556, 569 (2d Cir. 2015).
Requiring zero discharge in this case is neither arbitrary nor
capricious because it is the Best Available Technology (BAT) for
MEGS discharges.
This Court should uphold EAB’s determination that
discharges into the MEGS coal ash pond are not subject to effluent
limits. The EAB correctly held that the agency is not required to
regulate discharges into waste treatment systems designed to meet
the purposes of the CWA. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2. FCW invokes a
suspended clause from a 1980 agency rulemaking in arguing that
the MEGS coal ash pond is not a wastewater treatment system.
EnerProg, slip op. at 12. From a procedural standpoint, the
suspension is a valid exercise of agency discretion and is consistent
with both the APA and the CWA. As the EAB properly ascertained,
the suspension reflects a longstanding policy determination of the
agency and should not be disturbed. Id. Moreover, as the coal ash
pond is already subject to end-of-pipe effluent limits, applying the
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same effluent limits to waters entering the pond would render it
inoperable as a waste treatment system. Petitioners cannot simply
upend longstanding agency policy to force immediate closure of the
coal ash pond.
FCW’s secondary argument that the closure and capping of the
pond would require a section 404 fill permit is similarly without
merit. Id. at 12–13. The pond’s historical connection with Fossil
Creek notwithstanding, the pond is not currently a “water of the
United States” (WOTUS) subject to section 404 permitting
requirements, nor is there any precedent to suggest that it will
transform into a WOTUS upon retirement. See 33 C.F.R. § 323.2.
Furthermore, requiring a fill permit to close a coal ash pond is well
outside the scope and stated objectives of section 404, and serves
no clear purpose under the CWA. Therefore, this Court should
uphold the EAB’s determination that a fill permit is not required
for closure and capping activities.

ARGUMENT
I.

EPA HAS JURISDICTION TO REVIEW THE
PERMISSIBILITY OF STATE OF PROGRESS
CERTIFICATION CONDITIONS UNDER CWA
SECTION 401(d).

Section 401(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act (CWA) expressly
requires that “[a]ny applicant for a Federal license or permit to
conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or permitting agency
a certification from the State in which the discharge originates.”
33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). Based on the certification authority given
to states under CWA section 401(a), section 401(d) directs states to
grant, condition, or deny certifications based on a state-conducted
review of the activity to ensure consistency with CWA sections 301,
302, 306, and 307 as well as “with any other appropriate
requirement of State law.” Id. § 1341(d). The state authority to
condition under CWA section 401 is not absolute. The EPA, as the
issuing agency for NPDES permits, retains authority to review
state certification conditions.
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A. States Do Not Have Absolute Authority to Issue
Conditions on Federal Licenses Under CWA Section
401(d).
A plain reading of CWA section 401(d) shows that state
certification conditions are not absolute. States certification
conditions must “comply with applicable effluent limitations and
other limitations” under the above stated sections of the CWA and
“any other appropriate requirement of state law.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d). EPA regulations implementing section 401 provide
further guidance on state certification conditions. The regulations
require certifying agencies—the State of Progress in this case—to
include “[a] statement that there is a reasonable assurance that the
activity will be conducted in a manner which will not violate
applicable water quality standards.” 40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3)
(emphasis added). While deferring to states to set certification
conditions, the “reasonable assurance” requirement nonetheless
bounds their authority under section 401(d). The Supreme Court
in PUD No. 1 affirmed this interpretation, holding that “[a]lthough
§ 401(d) authorizes the State to place restrictions on the activity as
a whole, that authority is not unbounded.” 511 U.S. at 712. See also
Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616, 623 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“The
certification power of the states under section 401 is not . . .
unbounded.”).
B. The EPA Is the Appropriate Authority to Review
and Reject State Certification Conditions Under
CWA Section 401(d).
The bounded nature of state conditioning authority under
CWA section 401 necessitates a reviewing entity. This entity is the
EPA. This is evident upon a holistic examination of the CWA,
particularly analogous sections providing states with authority to
establish water quality standards. See Koons Buick Pontiac GMC,
Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 60 (2004) (“Statutory construction is a
holistic endeavor.”); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 158
(1990) (“In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not
only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the
statute as a whole and to its object and policy.”). Additionally, this
Court in interpreting CWA section 401 should be mindful of the
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balance of regulatory authority between federal agencies and
states. See City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 64 (1988) (“The
statutorily authorized regulations of an agency will pre-empt any
state or local law that conflicts with such regulations or frustrates
the purposes thereof.”). The EPA would effectively relinquish its
congressional mandate under the CWA to regulate water pollution
without the authority to review state certification conditions.
1. The CWA Already Gives EPA the Authority to Review State
Standards.
The Ninth Circuit in Pronsolino v. Nastri explained that,
pursuant to section 303 of the CWA, “[t]he states are required to
set water quality standards . . . . If a state does not set water
quality standards, or if the EPA determines that the state’s
standards do not meet the requirements of the Act, the EPA
promulgates standards for the state.” 291 F.3d 1123, 1127 (9th Cir.
2002). The CWA already gives the EPA authority to review state
standards, and EPA has similar authority to review state
certification conditions under CWA section 401(d). This inference
is further supported by the Supreme Court’s analysis in PUD No.
1 outlining the link between section 401(d) and section 303 of the
CWA: “Although § 303 is not specifically listed in 401(d), the
statute allows States to impose limitations to ensure compliance
with § 301 of the Act, and § 301 in turn incorporates § 303 by
reference.” 511 U.S. at 701. Based on the Supreme Court’s holding
that section 303 of the CWA is part of section 401 (by reference)
and that state authority is bounded, it can be reasonably inferred
that the EPA’s reviewing authority under section 303 also extends
to section 401.
The EAB erred in ruling that EPA does not have discretion to
reject a state certification condition. EnerProg, slip op. at 11. In its
decision, EAB cited American Rivers v. FERC, where the Second
Circuit held that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) did not have the authority to reject certain state-imposed
conditions on hydropower project licenses. 129 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir.
1997). However, the CWA establishes EPA as the predominant
authority in implementing the Act, making its role distinct from
other federal agencies in regulating state certification conditions.
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251. While other federal agencies such as FERC
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are given licensing authority under CWA section 401, it is clear
that the EPA—as the administering agency of the CWA—has
additional authority and expertise to review state certification
conditions to ensure consistency with the CWA at large. The court
recognizes this distinction in American Rivers stating that
“FERC’s interpretation of § 401 . . . receives no judicial deference
under the doctrine of Chevron . . . because the Commission is not
Congressionally authorized to administer the CWA.” 129 F.3d at
107 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S.
837 (1984)). Also implicit in the court’s holding in American Rivers
is the assumption that the administering agency of the CWA
should be granted judicial deference. This Court should therefore
defer to EPA’s interpretation of CWA section 401 as giving EPA
the authority to review state certification conditions.
2. Without EPA Authority to Review State Standards, the
EPA Would Be Subordinate to State Control in
Administering the CWA.
Courts have recognized the intent of CWA section 401(d) to
give “broad authority” to states to include their own substantive
policies in certification conditions. Keating v. FERC, 927 F.2d 616,
623 (D.C. Cir. 1991). However, courts are wary of giving states the
final say in imposing certification conditions. In California v.
FERC, the Supreme Court held that “[a]llowing California to
impose significantly higher minimum stream flow requirements
would disturb and conflict with the balance embodied in [this]
considered federal agency determination” and agreed with FERC’s
position that the significantly more stringent California standards
would “interfere with its comprehensive planning authority.” 495
U.S. 490, 506 (1990). A similar interpretation should extend to
EPA in the case at hand. EPA’s position as a check on the authority
of the states to set their own certification conditions is consistent
with the intent of the CWA as stated above.
The EPA is best positioned to review state decisions due to
both its subject matter expertise and its unique vantage point
allowing it to make assessments on inter-state water quality
beyond the parochial concerns of states. This does not leave states
without recourse, however. As evidenced by the case at hand,
should states and the EPA be at odds over section 401(d)
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certification conditions, the EAB and relevant courts have the
authority to make final rulings based on the merits. This Court
should therefore recognize EPA’s authority to review state
certification conditions under section 401.
II.

THE ASH POND CLOSURE AND REMEDIATION
CONDITIONS SET BY THE STATE OF
PROGRESS
CONSTITUTE
APPROPRIATE
REQUIREMENTS OF STATE LAW UNDER CWA
SECTION 401(d).

Parties do not dispute whether the MEGS coal ash pond
requires an NPDES permit for discharges into the Moutard
reservoir or that this permit is subject to state certification.
Instead, the dispute centers on whether the State certification
conditions related to the coal ash pond (the “CACA requirements”)
fall within the scope of CWA section 401(d). The certification
requirements set by the State of Progress fall within the scope of
the CWA provisions on state water quality and effluent limitations
referenced and incorporated in section 401(d). Even in the case
that such requirements fall outside of the scope of these provisions,
they would still fall within the broad conditioning authority given
to states under the “appropriate state requirement” clause of
section 401(d). 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d).
A. CACA Requirements Are Consistent with CWA
Provisions Referenced and Incorporated by Section
401(d)
And
Are
Therefore
“Appropriate
Requirements of State Law.”
CWA section 401(a)(1) states that a permit is required for any
activity which “may result in any discharge into the navigable
waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1). “Discharge” is defined as “any
addition of any pollutant of navigable water from any point
source.” Id. § 1362(12). If there is any discharge, “the activity as a
whole” can be subject to “additional conditions and limitations.”
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. Currently, end-of-pipe discharges from
the coal ash pond are regulated under the NPDES permit.
However, even after closure of the pond, the MEGS facility will still
require an NPDES permit for other facility discharges (e.g., cooling
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tower blowdown and discharges from the planned retention basin).
EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. Therefore, dewatering, capping, and
other remediation conditions of the coal ash pond can be
incorporated into this permit because “activities—not merely
discharges—must comply with state water quality standards.”
PUD No. 1, 511 U.S. at 712. Moreover, pursuant to section
401(a)(1), the mere risk of discharges from the closed coal ash pond
renders it subject to CWA section 401 regulation. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(a)(1) (“Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to
conduct any activity . . . which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing . . . agency a
certification from the State in which the discharge originates.”)
(emphasis added).
1. Closure and Capping of the Coal Ash Pond Are Legitimate
Requirements for Achieving State Water Quality Standards
Under CWA Section 303.
Section 303 requires states to establish water quality
standards for both intrastate and interstate waters. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1313. The Supreme Court in PUD No. 1 held that “ensuring
compliance with § 303 is a proper function of the § 401
certification” and that these state water quality standards would
be “among the other limitations with which a State may ensure
compliance through the § 401 certification process.” 511 U.S. at
713. The EPA has consistently interpreted section 303 water
quality standards to include numerical as well as non-numerical
criteria. “Criteria” is defined as “elements of State water quality
standards, expressed as constituent concentrations, levels, or
narrative statements . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b). Courts have
upheld the EPA’s non-numerical interpretation of “criteria.” See,
e.g., PUD No. 1, 411 U.S. at 715. Capping and closure requirements
qualify as non-numerical standards—or “narrative statements.”
The requirements are intended to prevent significant
contamination of waters in the event that pollutants from the ash
pond seep into groundwater systems and enter surface waters
regulated by the CWA; as such, they are clearly related to water
quality standards. The possibility of pollutants discharging into
regulated waters meets the threshold condition of CWA section
401(a)(1), which requires only that the activity may result in a
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discharge to trigger licensing requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1).
Therefore, the State of Progress’ inclusion of conditions for capping
and closure of the pond are appropriate under the CWA.
2. CACA Requirements for Ash Pond Closure and Capping
Are Consistent with CWA Sections 301 and 302
Establishing Effluent Limitations.
The effluent limitations under sections 301 and 302 of the
CWA pertain to discharges to surface waters. In establishing
closing and capping requirements for the coal ash pond, the State
of Progress is in effect setting an effluent limitation for the coal ash
pond to zero. Id. §§ 1311– 1312. Even if this Court finds that the
state capping and closure conditions fall outside the boundaries of
regulating “the activity as a whole,” the coal ash pond can
independently be viewed as a point source subject to CWA
regulation. Under the CWA, a “point source” is “any discernible,
confined and discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or
may be discharged.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (emphasis added). Courts
have held that coal ash ponds can be point sources. See Yadkin
Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, 141 F. Supp. 3d
428, 443–44 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (“coal ash lagoons are surface
impoundments designed to hold accumulated coal ash in the form
of liquid waste . . . [and] appear to be confined and discrete.”). Cf.
Sierra Club v. Va. Elec. & Power Co., 247 F. Supp. 3d 753, 763 (E.D.
Va. 2017) (finding that coal ash piles are point sources and that
any discharge that connects with surface water is broadly
considered surface water subject to CWA regulation).
Furthermore, even if a coal ash pond is dewatered, it is still a
confined and discrete conveyance to nearby navigable waters that
constitutes a point source. See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn.
Valley Auth., No. 3:15-CV-00424, 2017 WL 3476069 (M.D. Tenn.
Aug. 4, 2017). Therefore, even without the broad regulatory
authority provided to states under the CWA, the state closure and
capping requirements can independently be considered
appropriate effluent limitations under CWA section 401.
B. CACA Requirements Are Appropriate State
Requirements Under CWA Section 401(d), as States
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Have Broad Authority Beyond the Scope of the CWA
to Impose Certification Conditions.
Even if this Court does not deem the CACA requirements to
be consistent with water quality standards or effluent limitations
under the CWA, they are clearly “appropriate state
requirement[s].” 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d). Courts have not explicitly
ruled on the limits of the “appropriate state requirement” clause of
section 401(d). However, in practice, courts have given broad
deference to states and tribes in establishing standards under the
CWA. For example, in Albuquerque v. Browner, the Tenth Circuit
upheld ceremonial standards established by an Indian tribe, which
were neither water quality standards nor effluent limitations. 97
F.3d. 415, 423 (10th Cir. 1996). The EPA has recognized this broad
deference to states in its regulations implementing section 401,
where it merely requires states provide “[a] statement that there
is a reasonable assurance that the activity will be conducted in a
manner which will not violate applicable water quality standards.”
40 C.F.R. § 121.2(a)(3) (emphasis added). In PUD No. 1, the
Supreme Court interpreted the EPA’s “reasonable assurance”
standard to give broad authority to States under section 401. 511
U.S. at 715. This deference fits within the federalism Congress
envisioned in enacting the CWA. See S.D. Warren Co., 547 U.S. at
386 (“State certifications under § 401 are essential in the scheme
to preserve state authority to address the broad range of
pollution.”). Therefore, state capping and closure requirements fall
within the “appropriate state requirements” clause under CWA
section 401(d).
III.

THE STAY NOTICE IS EFFECTIVE TO REQUIRE
SUSPENSION OF COMPLIANCE DEADLINES OF
THE 2015 ELGS UNDER APA SECTION 705.

The April 25, 2017 EPA notice (“the Stay Notice”) is effective
to require suspension of compliance dates for the 2015 Steam
Electric Power Generating Source Category ELGs (“2015 ELGs”),
including the November 1, 2018 compliance deadline for achieving
zero discharge of coal ash transport water.1 See Postponement of
Compliance Dates for Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the
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Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed.
Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25, 2017).
EPA has specific authority under section 705 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to postpone compliance
deadlines of its own duly promulgated rules “when justice so
requires.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. Specifically, “[w]hen an agency finds that
justice so requires, it may postpone the effective date of action
taken by it, pending judicial review” Id. (emphasis added). The
statute itself is silent on the definition of “effective date.” However,
when read as a phrase, “effective date of an [agency action]” is
clearly not the same as the “effective date of a rule,” especially
when separate statutory definitions are assigned to “agency action”
and “rule.” See id. §§ 551(4), (13). Because compliance deadlines
are agency actions, EPA reasonably construed the statute to allow
for the postponement of compliance deadlines. In this case, the
Administrator determined that postponement of the compliance
deadlines of the revised 2015 ELGs is required by justice, pending
judicial review of the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. Furthermore,
the Stay Notice does not require notice and comment procedures
pursuant to section 553 of APA because it is not a formal
rulemaking. See id. §§ 551(4)–(5).1
A. EPA Reasonably Interpreted “Effective Date” in
Section 705 of APA To Include Compliance Dates.
EAB relied on a misreading of section 705 of the APA in
holding that the Stay Notice is not effective to postpone compliance
dates of 2015 ELGs. EnerProg, slip op. at 11. As previously stated,
section 705 allows an agency to delay the “effective date of an
action taken by it.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. EAB appears to interpret
“effective date of an action” to mean the “effective date of a rule.”
Such a reading does not comport with the plain text of the statute.
When a word or phrase is defined in a statute, that definition
governs as long as it is applicable in the context used and does not
conflict with other language in the statute or its purpose. See, e.g.,
1 Regardless of the validity of the Stay Notice, EnerProg is separately required by its
NPDES permit to achieve zero discharge by November 1, 2018. This requirement was
included by the permit writer applying Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) in the drafting
process, and is discussed further in Section IV.
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FCC v. AT&T, 562 U.S. 397, 404–407 (2011) (holding that the
undefined term “personal” is different from the explicitly defined
term “person”); Burgess, 553 U.S. at 129, 135 (holding that “felony
drug offense” should be read as per the definition in the statute
because it is “coherent, complete, and by all signs exclusive”);
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 942 (2000) (upholding explicit
statutory definition of “partial birth abortion”); Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (denying to extend the statutory
definition of “viable” to “may be viable” because it would frustrate
the purpose of the provision).
On its face, the plain language of the APA does not
communicate intent on Congress’ part that an action taken by an
agency should be understood to apply only to the effective date of
a promulgated rule. In fact, Congress has distinguished between
“rule” and “agency action” in the APA. “Agency action” is defined
broadly as “the whole or a part of any agency rule, order, license,
or sanction, relief or the equivalent or denial thereof, or the failure
to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (emphasis added). Whereas, “rule” is
defined very specifically as:
whole or a part of an agency statement . . . designed to implement,
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization,
procedure, or practice requirements of an agency and includes the approval
or prescription for the future of rates, wages, corporate or financial
structures or reorganizations thereof, prices, facilities, appliances, services
or allowances therefor or of valuations, costs, or accounting, or practices
bearing on any of the foregoing.

Id. § 551(4). The definitions enumerated in the APA clearly
indicate that an agency action is meant to encompass a broad array
of decisions and undertakings, only one of which is a rule.
Compliance dates are but one of the types of agency actions and
therefore, may be postponed pursuant to section 705 of the APA.
See id. § 551(4)–(5), (13).
Superimposing unstated restrictions on the plain text of a
statute is inappropriate and should be avoided – particularly when
doing so risks material injury to stakeholders by subjecting them
to costly—and potentially unnecessary—compliance measures.
More importantly, a restricted interpretation, which is
unsupported by the statute itself, would frustrate APA’s purpose
in granting an agency power to stay its own actions when justice
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so requires, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly held to be a
primary consideration when interpreting statutes. See Colautti,
439 U.S. at 392 (1979). Therefore, the Court should treat “effective
date of action taken by [an agency]” to encompass compliance
deadlines within the purview of APA section 705.
B. EPA is Generally Authorized to Postpone Effective
Dates of Agency Actions Pending Judicial Review
When Justice So Requires.
There are only two explicit factors that EPA has to satisfy
under APA section 705 to stay the effective date of its action: (1)
EPA must find that “justice so requires;” and (2) the action must
be “pending judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 705. The Stay Notice meets
both of these factors.
1. EPA Reasonably Concluded That “Justice So Requires”
Staying the 2015 ELG Compliance Deadlines.
Within the purview of APA section 705, EPA concluded that
justice required it to postpone the compliance deadlines in light of
the significant compliance costs and uncertainty created by a legal
challenge to the Rule. See Postponement of Compliance Dates for
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power
Generating Point Source Category, 82 Fed. Reg. 19,005 (Apr. 25,
2017). The Stay Notice merely purports to protect the status quo of
the current industry environment, without imposing additional
obligations or duties on regulated parties while the matter is being
litigated. Id. This alone should satisfy the first factor of APA
section 705 to postpone compliance dates.
Moreover, it is important to note that EPA declared its intent
to reconsider the Rule in the Stay Notice. Id. There is no question
that EPA has the authority to revise its rules. See 5 U.S.C. § 553.
Particularly, “change in administration brought about by the
people casting their votes is a perfectly reasonable basis for an
executive agency’s reappraisal” of its policies. Nat’l Ass’n of Home
Builders v. EPA, 682 F.3d 1032, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (citing Motor
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)). The Stay Notice was issued only months after
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the new EPA Administrator took office. Agency review of previous
policies and promulgated rules is reasonable under the precedent
set by Home Builders. Furthermore, the CWA specifically
authorizes EPA to review effluent guidelines. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d).
These revisions would be subject to appropriate notice and
comment rulemaking procedures pursuant to APA section 553,
which would take considerable time to complete. Meanwhile, EPA
is taking additional steps to address issues raised by other
stakeholders with the promulgated 2015 ELGs. See Postponement
of Compliance Dates for the Effluent Limitations Guidelines for
the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 82
Fed. Reg. 26,017 (June 6, 2017). In light of reconsideration of the
Rule, EPA has requested the Fifth Circuit to hold the case at
abeyance, which was granted. Id. at 26,018, While reconsideration
of a rule is not a sufficient reason to postpone effective dates under
section 705, reconsideration in this instance is directly related to
the pending litigation. Staying the compliance deadlines offers an
immediate—and just— approach to relieve regulated parties from
complying with standards that might be ultimately remanded (due
to changes in the rule itself) or vacated. Therefore, EPA reasonably
determined that justice so requires staying the compliance
deadlines.
2. EPA Issued Stay Notice Pending Judicial Review in the
Fifth Circuit.
In Sierra Club v. Jackson, the court held that a postponement
of effective dates of an EPA action was inappropriate because the
Delay Notice issuing the stay merely referenced the litigation in
passing and did not ground the stay in the existence or
consequences of the pending litigation. 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 33
(D.D.C. 2012). Unlike the Delay Notice of Sierra Club, the Stay
Notice at issue was announced pending a direct legal challenge to
the 2015 ELGs in the Fifth Circuit. The stay is grounded in the
potential consequences of this litigation as discussed previously.
See supra Section III.B.1. Therefore, EPA is acting within its
authority to stay the compliance deadlines pursuant to section 705
of the APA.
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C. The Stay Notice Is Not Subject to Notice and
Comment Rulemaking Procedures Because It Is Not
a Rule.
A rule by definition is “designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 551(4). EPA is required to
carry out specific procedures pursuant to section 553 of the APA in
order to engage in rulemaking, which is the “process for
formulating, amending, or repealing a rule.” Id. §§ 551(5), 553. In
Sierra Club, the court held that a Delay Notice meant to “preserve
the status quo does not constitute a substantive rulemaking
because, by definition, it is not designed to implement, interpret,
or prescribe law or policy” and was not subject to notice and
comment requirements. 833 F. Supp. 2d at 28 (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(5)) (internal punctuation omitted).
EPA is not implementing, interpreting, or prescribing law or
policy in issuing the Stay Notice. Similar to the purpose of the
Delay Notice in Sierra Club, the Stay Notice here simply stays the
compliance deadlines in order to preserve status quo until the
judicial review of the rule is complete to prevent subjecting
regulated parties to uncertain regulatory demands. Therefore, the
Stay Notice is not a rule that would require EPA to initiate noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures before issuance, and it is
effective to suspend the compliance deadlines pursuant to section
705 of APA.
IV.

BEST PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT IS VALID
ALTERNATIVE GROUNDS TO REQUIRE ZERO
DISCHARGE OF COAL ASH TRANSPORT
WASTES, INDEPENDENT OF 2015 ELGS.

The 2015 ELGs require NPDES permits to include zero
discharge of ash transport water as a permitting condition. 40
C.F.R. § 423.13. However, given the uncertain status of the
compliance deadlines proposed by the 2015 ELGs, EPA can
alternatively rely on Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) to require
zero discharge of coal ash transport wastes. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1)(B) (authorizing the Administrator to issue NPDES
permits if discharge meets “such conditions as the Administrator
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determines are necessary to carry out the provisions of [section
402]”).
Technology based effluent limitations (TBELs), established by
the EPA in ELGs, must be incorporated into NPDES permits. 33
U.S.C. § 1314. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 563–564;
Texas Oil & Gas Ass’n v. E.P.A., 161 F.3d 923, 928–29 (5th Cir.
1998). However, TBELs are not all-encompassing. When there is
no ELG that applies to the permit applicant’s specific discharge, or
an existing ELG applies to only a part of the discharge, the permit
writer is authorized under section 402(a)(1) of CWA to use his or
her BPJ to determine appropriate TBELs. 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–
(3); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1). Unless BPJ application in these
circumstances is arbitrary or capricious pursuant to the judicial
review standard established in the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, courts are
highly deferential to the technical expertise of the permit writer
and the agency in setting TBELs. See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808
F.3d at 569, Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 933.
If the 2015 ELGs are inapplicable, requiring zero discharge of
coal ash transport wastes is authorized under the CWA through
BPJ. EPA determined that dry handling of ash transport water is
the best applicable technology (BAT) and therefore, a reasonable
TBEL for this category. BAT, here, results in zero discharge.
Furthermore, the permit writer reasonably concluded that MEGS
can comply with this standard. Therefore, zero discharge
requirement of ash transport as a TBEL is an appropriate exercise
of BPJ because it is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
A. EPA Is Authorized to Set Effluent Limits on a CaseBy-Case Basis Using BPJ Under 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)
and 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2), When ELGs are
Inapplicable to The Permit Applicant’s Discharges.
Under 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c)(2)–(3), which incorporates section
402(a) of CWA, the Administrator and permit writer are
authorized to use their best professional judgment in setting
effluent limits for a specific plant where there is no applicable ELG
regulating a specific discharge, or an existing ELG applies to some
aspects of the applicant’s discharge but does not address others.
See Riverkeeper, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 174, 203 (2d Cir. 2004)
(holding case-by-case permit issuance valid when categorical
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regulation is not feasible); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 859 F.2d
156, 197 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that BPJ is valid grounds to
issue permits when there is no national guideline on the issue);
Consolidated Permit Application Forms for EPA Programs, 45 Fed.
Reg. 33,516, 33,520 (May 19, 1980) (discussing situations where
permit writer’s BPJ must be used to set effluent limits). Case-bycase effluent limits established through BPJ allow EPA to achieve
the pollution reduction goals of the CWA when there are regulatory
gaps in the promulgated national guidelines.
In the case at hand, EnerProg contests the inclusion of the zero
discharge requirement in the re-issued NPDES permit. When the
permit was issued, the 2015 ELGs were already in effect. See
Effluent Limitations Guidelines for the Steam Electric Power
Generating Point Source Category, 80 Fed. Reg. 67,837 (Nov. 3,
2015) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 423). Under the 2015 ELGs, BAT
was zero discharge through dry handling for ash transport wastes.
40 C.F.R. § 423.13. Regardless of the status of the 2015 ELGs, the
outcome would be the same for this permit. If the 2015 ELGs stand,
the zero discharge requirement in the permit can be upheld on the
basis of the ELGs. On the other hand, if the 2015 ELGs are vacated
by the Fifth Circuit or this Court upholds the Stay Notice, the
category-specific national ELGs would revert back to the 1982
ELGs, which were in effect before the 2015 revision. The 1982
ELGs do not cover all the pollutants pertaining to the MEGS coal
ash waste (such as mercury, arsenic and selenium) that EPA is
required to regulate. See Steam Electric Power Generating Point
Source Category; Effluent Limitations Guidelines, 47 Fed. Reg.
52,290, 52,307 (Nov. 19, 1982) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 125, 423).
Where such regulatory gaps exist, EPA is empowered to enforce
pollution limits on a case-by-case basis using BPJ even when such
limits are more stringent than national standards. 40 C.F.R.
§ 125.3(c)(2)–(3). See Nat. Res. Def. Council, 859 F.2d at 201–202
(holding that stricter standards imposed through BPJ are valid
even if the ELGs in effect are more lenient). Therefore, use of BPJ
in this instance would be appropriate, if the 1982 ELGs (not the
2015 ELGs) are in effect.
B. Courts Should Defer to EPA’s Expertise Because
BPJ Application Here Is Neither Arbitrary nor
Capricious.
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The APA establishes the appropriate standard for this Court
to apply in reviewing the agency application of BPJ at issue. 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).2 See also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 569
(applying arbitrary and capricious standard to the review of
NPDES permit); Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 933 (upholding EPA’s use
of BPJ in formulating BAT as neither arbitrary nor capricious).
Applying this standard of review, courts have largely enforced
requirements imposed through BPJ. See Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal.
v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 201 (4th Cir. 2009); Texas Oil,
161 F.3d at 933. See also Nat. Res. Def. Council, 808 F.3d at 569,;
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 29, 43. Regardless, EnerProg
bears the burden of proving that the permit writer’s application of
BPJ is unsupported by evidence or otherwise doesn’t conform to
“minimal standards of rationality.” See Texas Oil, 161 F.3d at 934.
The permit drafting process and its consistency with the CWA and
other agency regulations make it abundantly clear that petitioners
cannot meet this burden.
EPA specifies several factors that a permit writer should
consider when setting BAT limitations as per 40 C.F.R. § 125.3(c).3
40 C.F.R. § 125.3(d). These factors overlap with the conditions that
the agency itself must consider in promulgating the ELGs. 33
U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B). By considering largely the same factors,
limitations set through BPJ are necessarily consistent with ELGs,
other relevant EPA regulations, and the CWA itself. See EPA,
NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual, 5–44 to 5–48 (Sept. 2010).
The 2015 ELGs, which were subject to extensive notice-andcomment procedures and stakeholder involvement, arrived at the
same conclusion as BPJ application in this case: dry handling was
BAT for this industry. Dry handling of coal ash transport wastes
to achieve zero discharge is not even unique as an industry
practice. In fact, 67% of facilities that EPA studied in formulating
2 “The reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings,
and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law[.]” 5. U.S.C. 706(2)(A).
3 Factors include: “[t]he age of equipment and facilities involved; . . . [t]he process
employed; . .. [t]he engineering aspects of the application of various types of control
techniques; . . . [p]rocess changes; . . . [t]he cost of achieving such effluent reduction; and . . .
[n]on-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements).” 40 C.F.R.
§125.3(d).
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the 2015 ELGs were already dry handling or removing their fly ash
transport through scrubbing. EPA, Technical Development
Document for the Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards
for the Steam Electric Power Generating Point Source Category, 4–
21 (Sept. 2015). Furthermore, the permit writer in this case
determined that MEGS does not deviate from the point-source
category significantly to merit substantially different TBELs, and
that it is sufficiently profitable to adopt dry handling and achieve
zero discharge with minimal economic impact. EnerProg, slip op.
at 9. This finding has also been upheld by the EAB. Id. at 11.
EnerProg may take exception to the EPA requiring MEGS to
eliminate discharge of coal ash waste, but there is no real
argument that use of BPJ in formulating this requirement was
arbitrary or capricious – particularly when dry handling is already
a widespread industry practice. EPA’s decision to incorporate this
requirement in the permit through BPJ is valid in the case that
the 2015 ELGs are vacated, and this Court should concur with the
EAB’s judgment on this issue.
V.

SECTION 402 PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS
DO NOT APPLY BECAUSE THE CWA EXEMPTS
WASTE TREATMENT SYSTEMS AND THIS
COURT SHOULD DEFER TO EPA AUTHORITY
TO IMPLEMENT THE CWA.

Section 402 of the CWA prohibits the discharge of pollutants
into “navigable waters,” from “any point source” unless in
compliance with the CWA through issuance of a valid NPDES
permit. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a); 1342. Navigable waters are defined
as “the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”
Id. § 1362(7). “Waters of the United States” (WOTUS) covers a
variety of interstate and intrastate waters susceptible to use in
interstate commerce, recreation, or aquaculture. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
The EPA has purposefully limited the scope of permitting
requirements through exceptions to this definition. These
exceptions include “waste treatment systems, including treatment
ponds or lagoons designed to meet the requirements of the Clean
Water Act.” Id. EPA acknowledges that the definition of WOTUS
and the scope of federal authority over certain isolated waters and
wetlands has been a topic of debate among regulators,
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environmental advocates, and industry groups in recent years. See
generally Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006) (plurality
opinion) (failing to reach a majority consensus on the definition of
“navigable waters” and the scope of federal authority over isolated
wetlands); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (holding in a 5-4 decision that an Army
Corps of Engineers rule extending scope of “navigable waters” to
intrastate ponds used by migratory birds was not authorized under
the CWA).
In this case, however, the plain language of the CWA and
implementing regulations are unambiguous: the EPA is not
required to regulate discharges into waste treatment systems
designed to meet the requirements of the CWA because these
systems are specifically exempted from WOTUS under 40 C.F.R.
§ 122.2. The MEGS coal ash pond clearly falls into this category:
the pond acts as a settling basin for transport waters containing
coal combustion residuals, where such waters can be treated prior
to discharge into the Moutard Reservoir. These external discharges
from the MEGS coal ash pond into the Moutard Reservoir at
Outfall 002 are subject to effluent limitations and monitoring
requirements, and are incorporated in the NPDES permit.
EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. As a waste treatment system designed to
meet the objectives of the CWA, discharges into the pond do not
require an NPDES permit. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.
The baseline WOTUS exemption for waste treatment systems
was created by EPA rulemaking in 1980. See Consolidated Permit
Regulations: RCRA; SDWA; CWA NPDES; CWA Section 404
Programs; and CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 45
Fed. Reg. 33,290 (May 19, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123,
124, 125). The original rulemaking included a final clause
(hereinafter, “the exception”) stating “this exclusion applies only to
manmade bodies of water which neither were originally created in
waters of the United States (such as disposal area in wetlands) nor
resulted from the impoundment of waters of the United States.”
This final clause was suspended by notice of the Administrator
prior to the effective date of the rule. See Consolidated Permit
Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980).
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A. EPA’s 1980 Suspension Is Proper and Sufficient to
Exempt Internal Discharges from Section 402
Permitting Requirements.
FCW do not appear to contest the substance of the pond’s
function as a waste treatment system. Instead, FCW invokes the
suspended clause of 40 C.F.R. 122.2 to argue that the coal ash pond
should be subject to the CWA’s section 402 permitting
requirements because the pond was created from an impoundment
of Fossil Creek in 1978. EnerProg, slip op. at 7. According to FCW,
the suspension of this clause (and by implication, the decisions of
subsequent administrations to continue the suspension) is invalid.
Following this logic, the MEGS coal ash pond is not an exempt
waste treatment system under the regulations, and therefore EPA
should be required to set effluent limits for discharges into the
pond. For the reasons stated below, this argument is not
persuasive.
1. EPA’s Decision to Suspend the Exception Was an
Interpretive Rule Not Subject to Notice-And-Comment
Requirements of APA Section 553(b).
FCW alleges that the suspension lacks statutory authorization
and violates notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 553. Setting aside the fact that Congress clearly entrusted
EPA with authority to administer the NPDES permitting system
and define the scope of waters subject to permitting requirements,
no relevant precedent exists to suggest that EPA’s suspension of a
single clause within a rule prior to the rule’s effective date is
sufficient to constitute a formal rulemaking under the APA. See 33
U.S.C. §§ 1361(a) (authorizing the Administrator to promulgate
regulations necessary to carry out functions of the CWA), 1342
(requiring the Administrator set conditions of NPDES permits to
ensure compliance with all relevant CWA pollution limits).
Assuming—without conceding—that the EPA’s long-term
suspension of the clause qualifies as a de facto rulemaking, it
would be properly classified as an interpretive rule and thus
exempt from notice-and-comment requirements of the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). A rule is interpretive rather than legislative if
the agency intends the rule to be no more than an expression of its
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construction of a statute or rule. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S.
v. Occupat’l Safety & Health Admin., 636 F.2d 464, 468 (D.C. Cir.
1980). In distinguishing legislative from interpretative rules,
courts analyze whether the rule creates any new rights or duties
for regulated entities. See Air Transp. Ass’n of America, Inc. v.
FAA, 291 F.3d 49 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that FAA’s
interpretation of a regulation did not represent a departure from
any definitive prior FAA interpretation such that it should have
required notice-and-comment). Courts have even granted
deference to interpretive rulemakings when such rulemakings
affect the substantive rights of parties. See Shell Offshore, Inc. v.
Babbitt, 238 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2001).
Recognizing that the exception was overbroad, the EPA
attempted to correct their mistake and suspended the clause
containing the exception. EPA’s actions were intended to ensure
the continued viability of wastewater treatment systems designed
to meet the requirements of the CWA and avoid unintended
consequences that would have resulted upon the effective date;
namely, forcing the immediate closure of a broad class of coal ash
ponds created from impounding surface waters. See Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980). The
suspension did not create any new rights or obligations in
regulated parties; instead, it merely reaffirmed the status quo. As
such, it should not be considered a substantive rulemaking subject
to notice-and-comment requirements.
2. Even If Notice-And-Comment Is Required, EPA’s Action to
Suspend the Exception Is Neither Arbitrary nor Capricious
and Warrants Judicial Deference.
EPA’s decision to suspend the exception, if held to the same
standards of review as a rescission of a regulation, is neither
arbitrary nor capricious. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., 463
U.S. at 30 (holding that a rescission of an occupant crash protection
standard is subject to an arbitrary and capricious standard of
judicial review). Instead, EPA’s decision in 1980 to suspend the
exception—and the decisions of subsequent administrations to
continue the suspension—reflect a well-reasoned policy
determination made within the scope of the agency’s authority
delegated under the CWA.
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On May 19, 1980, the EPA issued an expansive final rule
intended to consolidate permitting procedures for waste
management programs under several different laws, including the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), and the NPDES and section 404 fill
programs under the CWA. See Consolidated Permit Regulations:
RCRA; SDWA; CWA NPDES; CWA Section 404 Programs; and
CAA Prevention of Significant Deterioration, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,290
(May 19, 1980) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122, 123, 124, 125). On
July 16, 1980, EPA decided to suspend the final clause containing
the exception pending further rulemaking. See Consolidated
Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 48,620 (July 21, 1980). EPA
explained this decision in the Federal Register, noting that the rule
was potentially overbroad in subjecting existing coal ash surface
impoundments to new permitting requirements. Id.
EPA’s explanation here was likely understated. The exclusion
would have required the shutdown of existing coal ash ponds
created from the impoundment of waterways, including those in
existence prior to the CWA. Coal ash ponds are already subject to
end-of-pipe pollution controls for discharges. Under the exclusion,
the ponds themselves would be considered WOTUS, requiring the
same effluent limits for waters entering the ash ponds. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a). Subjecting an enclosed pond to pollution controls for
waters both entering and exiting the pond is not only
burdensome—it defeats the purpose of coal ash surface
impoundments. To do so would render the pond useless as a
mechanism to remove pollutants from waters prior to their
discharge back into circulation. Clearly, FCW is cognizant of this
fact and intends to force the immediate closure of the coal ash
pond. However, invalidating an otherwise viable mechanism for
wastewater treatment is antithetical to the intent of the CWA. See
Congressional declaration of goals and policy, 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
B. Defining WOTUS Is Within EPA’s Mandate Under
the CWA, and EPA’s Definition Thus Warrants
Deference.
Ultimately, the authority to define the scope of WOTUS begins
and ends with the EPA.
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When Congress has explicitly left a gap for an agency to fill, there is an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation, and any ensuing regulation is
binding in the courts unless procedurally defective, arbitrary or capricious
in substance, or manifestly contrary to the statute.

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (quoting
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837 (internal punctuation omitted)). Congress
did not provide a definition of WOTUS in the text of the CWA nor
did it speak to the types of impoundments that should be regulated.
Instead, Congress entrusted EPA with authority to define the
scope of WOTUS in furtherance of the stated objectives of the Act.
Thus, EPA’s decision to suspend the exclusion warrants judicial
deference.
VI.

A FILL PERMIT IS NOT REQUIRED FOR
CLOSURE OF MEGS ASH POND, BECAUSE THE
POND IS NEITHER A WOTUS NOR DO SUCH
CLOSURES FALL WITHIN SCOPE OF SECTION
404 PERMITTING.

Section 404 of the Act provides the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers with authority to issue permits for the “discharge of
dredged or fill material into the navigable waters at specified
disposal sites.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a). As defined, fill material means
“material placed in waters of the United States where the material
has the effect of: (i) replacing any portion of a water of the United
States with dry land; or (ii) changing the bottom elevation of any
portion of a water of the United States.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2
(emphasis added). The Army Corps and the EPA rely on an almostidentical definition of WOTUS, although codified separately. The
operative Army Corps definition—promulgated in 1993—never
included the wastewater treatment exclusion discussed in Section
IV, obviating the need for discussion here. See Clean Water Act
Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,008, 45,036 (Aug. 25, 1993)
(codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 323, 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116,
117, 122, 230, 232, 401).
A. Neither the Act nor Implementing Regulations
Include a Recapture Provision That Would Convert
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The argument that the closure of the pond requires a section
404 fill permit rests on the assumption that a coal ash settling pond
situated on a former creek bed will revert back to a WOTUS after
it has stopped accepting coal ash transport waters. This
assumption lacks foundation in the text of the law, nor is it
supported by any relevant precedent. Courts have only in limited
circumstances addressed the question of whether a body of water
can be “removed” from federal oversight through manmade
impoundments or diversions. These cases do not hold sway in the
present case, however, as they did not involve diversion of a stream
for purposes of constructing a waste treatment system used in
compliance with the CWA. See United States v. Moses, 496 F.3d
984, 988 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding defendant’s actions to reroute and
reshape an intermittent stream did not deprive it of status as a
WOTUS subject to the CWA). See also George v. Beavark, Inc., 402
F.2d 977, 978 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that a river once deemed
navigable before construction of a dam remains a navigable stream
and thus subject to federal jurisdiction). It is unclear if any court
has found an unregulated body can become a federal water because
of a historical connection to a former creek bed.
Ultimately, EPA’s decision not to subject the MEGS coal ash
pond to Section 404 fill requirements in reissuance of the NPDES
permit reflects the agency’s judgment that doing so is not required
by the CWA. In the absence of precedent or a clear directive from
Congress, this Court must defer to the EPA’s reasonable
interpretation of both the CWA and the EPA’s own regulations. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 (“If the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.”). Likewise, the EPA is owed
substantial deference in the interpretation of its own duly
promulgated regulations. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965) (“When the construction of an administrative regulation
rather than a statute is in issue, deference is even more clearly in
order.”).
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B. Section 404 Is Not Intended to Cover Closure of Coal
Ash Ponds.
In the absence of informative jurisprudence, the physical
characteristics of the MEGS pond clearly place it outside the scope
of “navigable waters” requiring a fill permit. 33 U.S.C. 1344(a),
1362(7). This is consistent with EPA and the Army Corps’
interpretation of the purpose of the 404 permitting provisions and
the Act itself: the legislative history of the CWA and the
formulation of section 404 reveals congressional intent to protect
wetlands, bays, estuaries, and river deltas from practices that
threaten fish and other wildlife. S. REP. NO. 95-370, at 9 (1977).
This emphasis on protecting aquatic ecosystems is echoed in Army
Corps regulations promulgated pursuant to section 404. See Clean
Water Act Regulatory Programs, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,036 (Aug. 25,
1993) (codified at 33 C.F.R. pts. 323, 328; 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112,
116, 117, 122, 230, 232, 401) (“The underlying focus of Section 404
is on evaluating, and, where possible, reducing and avoiding
adverse effects to the aquatic environment.”).
The MEGS coal ash pond is not an aquatic environment. It
does not serve as a spawning ground for shellfish or a nesting area
for birds or other wildlife, and there is no evidence that it will serve
as one upon closure. It functions purely as a waste treatment
system designed to meet the aims of the CWA by separating coal
ash waste from transport waters. A cursory examination of the
facts makes this clear. EnerProg, slip op. at 7–8. Once the pond
completes closure as required by the NPDES permit, it can no
longer be considered a “water” based on any regulatory
construction of the term. Indeed, the NPDES permit’s cap-in-place
requirement entails a complete dewatering of the MEGS pond—
leaving behind nothing but a contained mass of solid coal ash.
FCW’s implicit argument that the coal ash pond will revert back to
a WOTUS does not comport with any reasonable conception of
federal authority over waters.
C. Even If This Court Finds the Coal Ash Pond Has
Reverted to a WOTUS, the Coal Ash Pond Would
Remain a Waste Treatment System Exempt from
Section
404
Dredge
and
Fill
Permitting
Requirements upon Closure.
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FCW relies on an overly-strict interpretation of 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(b)(1) to argue that the scheduled cap-in-place of the MEGS
coal ash pond precludes reliance on the wastewater treatment
exemption during the closure process. For many of the same
reasons discussed previously, this argument lacks support in the
text of the Act and implementing regulations, and is inconsistent
with EPA and the Corps’ reasonable interpretations of their own
regulations, which deserve judicial deference. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344;
33 C.F.R. § 328.3; Udall, 380 U.S. at 16. The Corps’ definition of
WOTUS, like the EPA’s, specifically exempts “waste treatment
systems, including treatment ponds or lagoons designed to meet
the requirements of the Clean Water Act.” 33 C.F.R. § 328.3. FCW
argues that the coal ash pond will no longer be a waste treatment
system when it stops accepting coal ash transport waters and
begins closure.
Following FCW’s reading of the section 404 process,
EnerProg’s good faith efforts to comply with the legal requirements
of its NPDES permit—issued in accordance with the CWA—would
itself constitute a violation of the CWA. FCW’s strict interpretation
of the regulations implementing section 404 is at cross-purposes
with the objectives of the CWA and is without merit. Neither the
EPA nor the Army Corps reads the wastewater treatment
exemption’s language “including treatment ponds or lagoons
designed to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act” to limit
the types of wastewater treatment systems to only ponds or
lagoons in operation. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(b)(1) (emphasis added). See
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., 556 F.3d at 213 (finding that stream
segments linking strip mining operations to downstream sediment
ponds fall under the waste treatment system exemption).
Dewatering and capping an abandoned coal ash surface
impoundment in compliance with the NPDES permit and existing
EPA regulations for disposal of coal combustion residuals can be
reasonably viewed as a final step in the treatment process. See
generally 42 U.S.C. § 6901; 40 C.F.R. § 257 (“Criteria for
conducting the closure or retrofit of CCR units”). Again, where
Congress has provided EPA with the authority to promulgate
regulations implementing pollution control and solid waste laws,
EPA’s reasonable interpretations of these statutes—and of its own
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duly promulgated regulations— warrant deference. Chevron, 467
U.S. at 843; Udall, 380 U.S. at 16.

CONCLUSION
In re-issuing the NPDES permit for the MEGS facility, the
EPA acted as the final arbiter in the permitting process, and
appropriately exercised its authority to review permit conditions
proposed by the State of Progress pursuant to the Section 401
Certification process. In doing so, the EPA found that the capping
and closure requirements of the MEGS coal ash pond were
appropriate requirements of state law under section 401(d), as they
are consistent with state water quality standards and effluent
limitations under the CWA. EPA is not compelled to reject
otherwise valid requirements proposed by the State of Progress
simply because the federal law does not impose such requirements.
With respect to the permit requirement of zero discharge of
coal ash transport waters, EPA’s April 25 Stay Notice—issued
under the authority granted to the agency under the APA— is
effective to postpone compliance deadlines of the 2015 ELGs.
EAB’s holding to the contrary is based on a misreading of section
705 that artificially limits the agency authority to suspend
compliance deadlines when “justice so requires.” Notwithstanding
the validity of the Stay Notice, EnerProg remains bound by the
zero discharge requirement, as EPA Region XII can alternatively
rely on BPJ to require the same. As a matter of policy, the EPA
seeks to avoid second guessing the determinations of agency staff
made in accordance with their expertise and professional judgment
within the bounds of the CWA.
Finally, the EPA is not required to regulate internal
discharges into the MEGS coal ash pond, nor does closure of the
pond require a section 404 fill permit. Regardless of any historical
connection to Fossil Creek, the pond is a waste treatment system
designed to meet the objectives of the CWA and is therefore not
subject to effluent limits on incoming waters. Likewise, the
argument that the pond will become a WOTUS subject to 404
permitting requirements upon retirement has no legal footing.
Ultimately, the NPDES permit requirements were valid under
federal law when the permit was re-issued, and they remain valid.
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For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reject petitioners’
claims and uphold the NPDES permit as re-issued.
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